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Introduction  
Both necessity and ambition fueled by opportunity drive India's efforts to cut a figure in the 
Persian Gulf region. Four million Indians reside in the area and send valuable remittances home 
to their kinsmen, making them both hostages of the local security situation and also a sign of 
India's rising interest in the Gulf. This rising interest takes place in a context dominated by three 
interacting and profound strategic trends: India's rise as a major Asian power with continental 
aspirations, American dominance of the Gulf, and the visible Indo-American strategic 
partnership.[1] 
 
In that context India is determined to prevent any maritime or landward threat to it from the Gulf. 
Indeed, following Ashley Tellis' analysis in 2001-02, we can state that for India the Middle East 
and the Persian Gulf constitutes a vast strategic buffer, an outer ring, if you will, that cannot be 
allowed to become a base from which policies inimical to India's interests and security can be 
pursued with impunity. Because India must engage states in this area intimately to forestall such 
negative trends, India has confronted and robustly counters the related threats of terrorism, 
proliferation and the export of radicalized Islam.[2] The threat of proliferation in the Gulf, for 
example as abetted by China, obligates India's policymakers to assert New Delhi's presence 
there. As Tellis wrote,  
The relationship between China and various key states in Southeast Asia, 
Central Asia, and the Persian Gulf which have the effect of marginalizing India, 
reducing its access to the region, and creating pockets of Chinese influence in 
areas where natural resources, physical access, markets, and sources of 
influence are increasingly coveted, remain a good example of how the 
relationships among various states in the "outer ring" [of Indian security 
perspectives] could directly affect Indian interests.[3] 
In this respect, India is in many ways thinking along lines that are either typical of its erstwhile 
British masters who responded to threats they faced either from advancing major powers or from 
crumbling or failing states on the approach to India.[4] Likewise, India maintains that the Gulf 
must remain a stable and unimpeded source of energy. India not only depends on a stable supply 
of oil and gas from the Gulf, it is also now seeking to gain equity investment, through its national 
company the ONGC, in local energy projects.[5] Thus, Jasjit Singh, former head of India's 
Institute for Defense and Strategic Analyses and one of India's most respected strategic thinkers, 
wrote in 1998 that,  
India's economic growth cannot be maintained without assured access to energy, 
especially oil and gas. The bulk of India's oil supplies in the past have come from 
the West Asian region. This could change only marginally to the extent that the 
Central Asian resource base may be accessed in the future. This is why pipelines 
have been under consideration not only from Oman to India, but also from Iran, 
Turkmenistan, and other Central Asian countries. The 1995 tripartite agreement 
between Turkmenistan, Iran, and India creates the framework for such 
cooperation in the future. The experience of the past indicates that any 
disturbance in the access to or costs of oil from West Asia have a deleterious 
impact on India's economy. The oil shock of 1973 and the crisis of 1990-91 stand 
out as the more notable examples. Increasing consumption and demand for 
energy in India only increases India's sensitivity to the issue of assured access to 
oil (and gas) and its price. This had led the parliamentary committee on energy to 
emphasize energy security and conclude that “deficiencies in this critical strategic 
sector compromise national security."[6] 
Simultaneously India participates in the enormous Russian-inspired North-South transport 
corridor which will become a major international route for all kinds of trade from Russia through 
Iran and Central Asia and through the Gulf to India.[7] 
Desire to Lead 
Every assessment of Indian national security policies cites New Delhi's huge ambition to be 
recognized as and actually play the role of a major Asian power. Thus the long-term development 
of economic and military capabilities of power projection throughout the Indian Ocean, including 
the Gulf are now a matter of national policy as outlined by Prime Minister Atal Behar Vajpayee.[8] 
In November, 2003 he directed planners to craft defense strategies that extend beyond South 
Asia and transcend past sub-regional mindsets. India's expanded security perspectives, he 
claimed, require such fresh thinking about projecting power and influence, as well as security in 
all these directions. Thus India will seek more defense cooperation with states in the Gulf, 
Southeast, and Central Asia, presumably going beyond sharing intelligence about terrorist 
activities. This cooperation will proceed to more bilateral exchanges and exercises and greater 
sharing of defense advice with friendly nations. In this context relations of strategic partnership 
with Washington are essential because Russia's ties with India are tempered by Moscow's 
dependence on the West, particularly America. And because of Russia's dependence upon 
Washington as seen from New Delhi, India cannot rely upon Russian support if it comes into 
conflict with Washington, hence the need for strong ties to America.[9] 
 
While India formally eschews offensive military projections, it is formally announcing its base in 
Tajikistan, and hopes to undertake the following military programs through 2013: 
• Improve military logistics in Iran, Tajikistan, Kazakstan, and Uzbekistan. 
• Increase military interaction with Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, Laos, and 
Vietnam.  
• Increase naval interaction with African states, especially South Africa and with Gulf 
nations, especially Iran, Oman, and the UAE. 
• Extend infrastructure, logistic, and material support to Myanmar to contain Chinese 
activities there.[10]  
Beyond those policies all the Indian military services are currently undertaking a major buildup of 
conventional weapons, creating ways of delivering nuclear weapons, and preparing defenses 
against nuclear missiles by improving communication and surveillance systems. Although all the 
services will be built up, it bears noticing that the Navy will construct warships to make India's 
presence in the Indian Ocean "a force to be reckoned with" and thus one capable of force and 
power projection if necessary.[11] 
 
Attaining this status and being seen as having achieved it also makes India more valuable as ally 
and partner to Washington. Meanwhile India already possesses considerable experience and 
capability to project power in the form of peacekeeping or peace enforcement forces abroad. 
Indeed, in anticipation of playing exactly this role in Iraq, the Army and some in the government 
began to plan for that mission in 2003.[12] However major domestic political controversy and the 
failure of the UN to authorize foreign participation in an Iraqi peace operation prevented the 
government from authorizing the dispatch of troops there.[13] Nevertheless the Indian 
government is already deeply engaged in the Gulf. 
Interest in the Gulf 
For example, India and America have begun discussions of an Asian version of NATO.[14] While 
it remains unclear who would join this potential alliance, what its missions and purpose will be, 
and what its "rules of engagement" in peace operations will be, India has already provided access 
to the United States in its quest for bases against terrorism in the Indian Ocean, bases which 
were and are being used to prosecute the war in Afghanistan. In the event of future contingencies 
they could be used in the Gulf as well.[15] India also is very close to Iran and even signed a 
defense cooperation agreement with it in 2003, which some observers fear is directed against 
Pakistan.[16] India depends on access to Iranian energy, and to overland as well as maritime 
trade through the Gulf and the Indian Ocean. India also depends on Iran for direct access to 
Central Asia, a region that plays a growing role in Indian strategic calculations, has historically 
good ties to it, and shares a common antipathy to the Taliban and to Pakistani adventurism in 
Central Asia. Indeed, some Indians feel India could become an interlocutor to bring Tehran and 
Washington closer together.[17] 
 
Indian policies, like those of other states, attest to the fact that the Gulf, South Asia and Central 
Asia are now strategically interactive and interrelated regions or "theaters." Thus India's rivalry 
with Pakistan and its resistance to Pakistan's earlier tactic of using terrorism to put India under 
constant threat of dismemberment are certainly major factors in its strategic search for greater 
influence with Iran and in the Gulf. The objectives of India's quest for greater influence throughout 
the Gulf and Central Asia, are to prevent proliferation as well as terrorism. Indeed, as part of this 
quest, India has even acquired an air base in Tajikistan.[18] India regards the Gulf as a potential 
breeding ground for terrorism that could be targeted against Indian interests and thus it is 
determined to assert itself there to prevent that threat's overt expression and mutation into a 
threat based on WMD proliferation.  
 
This opposition to terrorism and proliferation not only brings India and America closer, it also 
catalyzes India's drive to outflank the territorial bases of these manifestations by finding points of 
influence in the Gulf and Central Asia and by developing a capability to assert and project its 
power in enduring fashion into these areas. But beyond rivalry with Pakistan the great strategic 
objective of India's rapprochement with Washington is to convince it that India truly merits being 
seen as an Asian power that can project influence and power throughout Asia on behalf of 
common interests against common threats . To the degree that the United States regards India 
as having legitimate security interests in the Gulf, Southeast Asia, and as far afield as the Straits 
of Malacca, India is then able to truly play a much greater role on its own. But beyond that it is 
then able to play a major role working together with Washington in areas that confront the United 
States with significant difficulties in projecting power: Central Asia, the Indian ocean, Southeast 
Asia. This cooperation in the "interstices" of Asia on the basis of a shared threat assessment 
concerning terrorism, proliferation and the desire to stabilize the Gulf so that those threats are 
snuffed out there drive much of India's current national security policy.[19] While those policies 
comport with America's for the most part, the frustration of terrorist challenges in a post-Saddam 
Iraq is intrinsically an important Indian interest even if it cannot yet commit forces there due to 
domestic considerations and a different valuation than America's concerning the need for a UN 
authorization. 
 
The Indian government not only wants Washington to restrain Pakistan from indulging in anti-
India activities, it also looks up to Washington for stabilizing the Gulf in order to stabilize the 
South Asian subcontinent and eliminate the territorial and political bases of the terrorism which 
threatens the entire region. Thus, assuming we can secure a UN authorization that empowers 
other states to participate in a post-conflict stability operation in Iraq, it is likely that the Indian 
government's larger interests in projecting power in the Gulf, stabilizing it, and in acting in concert 
with the United States will override the significant domestic opposition to an enduring Indian role 
in a post-Saddam security architecture for the Gulf. This architecture is clearly broader than 
merely establishing the basis for Iraq's long-term stability and security. But the latter is the 
essential precondition for any successful security architecture or structure in the region. Without 
such an architecture India's interests, security, and standing, not to mention American interests 
will be severely compromised. 
Conclusions 
India's ambitions, capabilities, experience and interests all suggest that it is interested in playing a 
major role in helping to stabilize the Persian Gulf in a post-Saddam era. The issue is how to we 
craft an invitation to India to do so which has a chance of succeeding. Obviously we have to stop 
dismissing the UN for no matter what we think, India, like many other states, sees its 
authorization as indispensable to any legitimization of the use of force or for deployment in post-
conflict stability operations. Second, before India enters into any such operation it will be 
necessary to conduct a candid discussion with it as to its strategic objectives, interests, and 
concerns in the new Gulf. And those interests and fears must be accommodated. Likewise, it will 
be necessary during this dialogue to elucidate its views as to how that structure or architecture 
should work and not just what it hopes to gain from its participation in any such system. 
 
In other words, the perception abroad that U.S. policy is characterized by excessive unilateralism 
must be shown to be groundless. Allies like India must be consulted and accommodated much 
more openly than was previously the case. This consultation must mean and be seen to mean 
more than that they were simply heard and that then we proceeded as we had intended to do 
anyway. Their interests in a stable Gulf, which after all are not far removed from our goals for the 
area, must be seen as legitimate and it must be understood that no unilateral American system 
stands any chance of more than ephemeral success in constructing a post-Saddam order in the 
Gulf. The beginning of wisdom in constructing a Gulf security architecture entails genuine 
dialogue with allies and partners and a genuine give and take among them and us. The gains in 
getting the participation of a rising power with a good reputation in the Gulf and a democratic 
tradition in such a security architecture far outweigh any losses involved in accommodating their 
interests there and in taking their advice when it makes sense. Partnership, if not alliance, with 
India is one of the fundamental points of the Administration's agenda and even preceded 
September 11.[20] As India's power and standing grow it makes all the sense in the world to 
exploit that partnership on behalf of interests and values that are fundamentally shared and 
compatible and against common threats. Failure to devise a basis for a significant Indian 
presence in the new Gulf, on the other hand, all but ensures that the architecture will be built on 
sand. 
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